Russia's View of the Iran Deal and U.S. Plans for Central Europe

Russia's View of the Iran Deal and U.S. Plans for Central Europe 

Stratfor 26-Nov-13

The landmark agreement the P-5+1 and Tehran reached over the weekend regarding the Iranian nuclear program is having effects beyond the immediate region. Speaking at a media forum in Rome on Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the deal obviates the need for NATO's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, given that the system -- championed by the United States -- was designed to counter potential missile threats from Iran. Lavrov noted that if the deal is implemented as planned, then "the stated reason for the construction of the defense shield will no longer apply." 

NATO's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe have long been one of the most contentious issues between Moscow and Washington. These plans, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, involve placing interceptor bases in Romania and Poland that are capable of shooting down various-ranged ballistic missiles. These are set to become operational in 2015 and 2018, respectively. The groundbreaking ceremony at the site in Romania took place last month. 

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While the European Phased Adaptive Approach is technically and officially designed to counter missile attacks specifically from Iran, the plans have drawn substantial concern from Russia. Moscow considers any NATO-related military buildup in Europe a potential threat, and Russia fears that the technology used in the development of the ballistic missile defense system could one day challenge Russia's intercontinental missile arsenal, which it relies on as its primary strategic deterrent. As the European Phased Adaptive Approach becomes more robust -- currently it is not much of a direct threat to Moscow, based on capabilities and placement -- it could seriously threaten Russia's ballistic missile capabilities in the long term. For years, Russia has demanded legal guarantees from NATO and the United States that the system would not target its strategic nuclear deterrent. This issue has been a constant sticking point in talks between Moscow and the West over ballistic missile defense. 

But there is a broader issue regarding ballistic missile defense that goes beyond the specifics of a system and legal guarantees: the battle between the United States and Russia for influence in Central Europe. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been worried by what it sees as the West's never-ending encroachment in its near abroad. The wave of NATO and EU expansion during the late 1990s and early 2000s occurred at a time when Russia was weak and came at great geopolitical cost to Moscow. Now Russia is stronger, but it still views any U.S.- or NATO-led military moves in Central and Eastern Europe through the same prism of interference, especially in what Russia deems as its sphere of influence. Russia thus views the ballistic missile defense system as an excuse for the United States to deploy military personnel in some of the most strategic borderland states of Europe. 

For Russia to raise the ballistic missile defense issue again immediately after the Iranian nuclear deal reveals two things. The first is Russia's more recent role in facilitating U.S. policy in the Middle East. This began with Russia developing a diplomatic resolution to the chemical weapons crisis in Syria and saving the United States from engaging in another unpopular military intervention in the region. The Syria resolution then opened the door for Iran and the United States to negotiate. Despite its reservations over a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, Russia knew it could do little to derail the process and calculated instead that its cooperation in the deal -- as opposed to its obstruction -- would give Russia substantial leverage in other more pressing issues with the United States. It is likely that NATO's ballistic missile defense plans for Central Europe would be on the top of Moscow's list of such issues. 

The second revelation is the far-reaching consequences of the Iranian nuclear settlement. Not only does a potential U.S.-Iranian understanding lead to a realignment of the balance of power in the Middle East, it also carries the potential for changes in a host of other regions, from Afghanistan to the Caucasus to Central Asia. The same could be said for Central Europe, considering how it intersects with U.S.-Russian negotiations that run parallel to U.S.-Iranian talks. 

How the Iranian nuclear agreement will actually affect the European Phased Adaptive Approach remains to be seen. The agreement is still in its initial phase and is subject to numerous obstacles and complications over the coming months. There is a big difference between the United States' conditional easing of certain sanctions on Iran and the official recognition that Iran no longer poses a military threat to the United States or its European allies. Moreover, Washington has been careful to reassure the Central European states that they are not being abandoned as a result of the Iran talks and accompanying negotiations with Russia. Earlier this month on a visit to Poland, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach would not be contingent on the Iran issue. So far, the United States has chosen to say little about ballistic missile defense, with mid-tier U.S. officials reiterating that the U.S. administration is willing to engage in dialogue with the Kremlin over the issue though not yet showing signs of backing away from the European Phased Adaptive Approach as part of a bargain with Moscow. 

Russia can be expected to continue pushing the issue, however, making clear to the United States that the price for its continued cooperation in the Middle East is Washington's tempering of its military aid for Central European countries. Russia will try to push the United States into an uncomfortable corner by exposing the eroding foundation of U.S. ballistic missile defense plans now that Iran is on the path to losing its pariah status. On the one hand, the weakening Iran pretext is making it difficult for the United States to justify the development of its ballistic missile defense strategy; on the other hand, the United States is not yet in a position to meaningfully challenge Russia in its near abroad through more direct forms of military assistance, especially while trying to tie up a number of loose ends in the Middle East. This state of limbo is exactly where Moscow wants Washington -- with Poland, Romania, Ukraine and others watching and wondering whether they can still count on the United States for support when they need it most.